



Uncertainty

Russell & Norvig Chapter 13



Uncertainty

Let A_t be the action of leaving for the airport t minutes before your flight
 Will A_t get you there on time?

A purely logical approach either

1. risks falsehood: " A_{120} will get me there on time", or
2. leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
 " A_{120} will get me there on time if there's no accident and it doesn't rain and my tires remain intact etc."

(A_{140} might reasonably be said to get me there on time but I'd have to stay overnight in the airport ...)



Uncertainty

Let A_t be the action of leaving for the airport t minutes before your flight
 Will A_t get you there on time?

Uncertainty results from:

1. partial observability (road state, other drivers' plans, etc.)
2. noisy sensors (traffic reports)
3. uncertainty in action outcomes (flat tire, etc.)
4. complexity of modeling traffic



Questions

- How to represent uncertainty in knowledge?
- How to perform inference with uncertain knowledge?
- Which action to choose under uncertainty?



Dealing with uncertainty

- **Implicit**
 - Ignore what you are uncertain of when you can
 - Build procedures that are robust to uncertainty
- **Explicit**
 - Build a model of the world that describes uncertainty about its state, dynamics, and observations
 - Reason about the effect of actions given the model



Methods for handling uncertainty

- **Default Reasoning:**
 - Assume the car does not have a flat tire
 - Assume A_{120} works unless contradicted by evidence
- **Issues:** What assumptions are reasonable? How to handle contradictions?
- **Worst case reasoning** (the world behaves according to Murphy's law).
- **Probability**
 - Model agent's degree of belief
 - Given the available evidence, A_{120} will get me there on time with probability 0.95

Probability



- Probabilities relate propositions to agent's own state of knowledge
e.g., $P(A_{120} \mid \text{no reported accidents}) = 0.96$
- Probabilities of propositions change with new evidence:
e.g., $P(A_{120} \mid \text{no reported accidents, 5 a.m.}) = 0.99$

Making decisions under uncertainty



Suppose I believe the following:


$P(A_{30} \text{ gets me there on time} \mid \dots)$	= 0.001
$P(A_{90} \text{ gets me there on time} \mid \dots)$	= 0.70
$P(A_{120} \text{ gets me there on time} \mid \dots)$	= 0.95
$P(A_{150} \text{ gets me there on time} \mid \dots)$	= 0.99
$P(A_{1440} \text{ gets me there on time} \mid \dots)$	= 0.9999

- Which action to choose?
Depends on my **preferences** for missing flight vs. time spent waiting, etc.
 - Utility theory** is used to represent and infer preferences
 - Decision theory** = probability theory + utility theory

Axioms of probability




- For any events A, B in a space of events Ω
 - $0 \leq P(A) \leq 1$
 - $P(\Omega) = 1$ and $P(\emptyset) = 0$
 - $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \wedge B)$



Axioms of probability



- $0 \leq P(\omega) \leq 1$ $\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} P(\omega) = 1$
- $P(A \vee B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \wedge B)$
[inclusion-exclusion principle]



Example



- Consider a deck of cards (52 cards) and the following events:
 - A king
 - A face card
 - A spade
 - A face card or a red suit
 - A card
- What is the probability of each of the above events?

Where do probabilities come from



- Two camps:
- Frequentist interpretation**
 - Bayesian interpretation**

Frequentist interpretation



- Draw a ball from an urn containing n balls of the same size; r are red, the rest black.
- The probability of the event "the ball is red" corresponds to the relative frequency with which we expect to draw a red ball
 $P(\text{red}) = ?$

Subjective probabilities



- There are many situations in which there is no objective frequency interpretation:
- You have worked hard on your AI class and you believe that the probability that you will get an A is 0.9
 - There are theoretical justifications for subjective probabilities!

The Bayesian viewpoint



- Probability is "degree-of-belief".
- To the Bayesian, probability lies subjectively in the mind, and can be different for people with different information
- In contrast to the frequentist, probability lies objectively in the external world.

Random Variables



- A random variable can be thought of as an unknown value that may change every time it is inspected.
- Suppose that a coin is tossed three times and the sequence of heads and tails is noted. The sample space for this experiment is:
 $S = \{HHH, HHT, HTH, HTT, THH, THT, TTH, TTT\}$.
 X - the number of heads in three coin tosses. X assigns each outcome in S a number from the set $\{0, 1, 2, 3\}$.

Outcome	HHH	HHT	HTH	THH	HTT	THT	TTH	TTT
X	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	0

- We can now ask the question – what is the probability for observing a particular value for X (the distribution of X).

Random Variables



- Boolean** random variables
 e.g., *Cavity* (do I have a cavity?)
 Distribution characterized by a number p .
- Discrete** random variables
 e.g., *Weather* is one of $\langle \text{sunny, rainy, cloudy, snow} \rangle$
- Domain values must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive
- The (**probability**) distribution of a random variable X with m values X_1, X_2, \dots, X_m is:
 (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m)
 with $P(X=x_i) = p_i$ and $\sum_i p_i = 1$

Joint Distribution



- Given n random variables X_1, \dots, X_n
- The **joint distribution** of these variables is a table in which each entry gives the probability of one combination of values of X_1, \dots, X_n
- Example:

	Toothache	\neg Toothache
Cavity	0.04	0.06
\neg Cavity	0.01	0.89

$P(\neg \text{Cavity} \wedge \text{Toothache})$ $P(\text{Cavity} \wedge \neg \text{Toothache})$

It's all in the joint



	Toothache	¬Toothache
Cavity	0.04	0.06
¬Cavity	0.01	0.89

- $P(\text{Toothache}) = P((\text{Toothache} \wedge \text{Cavity}) \vee (\text{Toothache} \wedge \neg \text{Cavity}))$
 $= P(\text{Toothache} \wedge \text{Cavity}) + P(\text{Toothache} \wedge \neg \text{Cavity})$
 $= 0.04 + 0.01 = 0.05$

We summed over all values of Cavity: **marginalization**

- $P(\text{Toothache} \vee \text{Cavity}) =$
 $P((\text{Toothache} \wedge \text{Cavity}) \vee (\text{Toothache} \wedge \neg \text{Cavity}) \vee (\neg \text{Toothache} \wedge \text{Cavity})) =$
 $0.04 + 0.01 + 0.06 = 0.11$

These are examples of **inference by enumeration**

Conditional Probability



- **Definition:**

$$P(A|B) = P(A \wedge B) / P(B) \quad (\text{if } P(B) > 0)$$

- **Read: probability of A given B**

- Example: $P(\text{snow}) = 0.03$ but $P(\text{snow} | \text{winter}) = 0.06$,
 $P(\text{snow} | \text{summer}) = 1e-6$

- can also write this as:

$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A|B) P(B)$$

- called the **product rule**

Example



	Toothache	¬Toothache
Cavity	0.04	0.06
¬Cavity	0.01	0.89

$$P(\text{Cavity} | \text{Toothache}) = P(\text{Cavity} \wedge \text{Toothache}) / P(\text{Toothache})$$
$$= 0.04 / 0.05 = 0.8$$

Product rule



- $P(A \wedge B \wedge C) = P(A|B,C) P(B|C) P(C)$

Bayes' Rule



$$P(A \wedge B) = P(A|B) P(B)$$
$$= P(B|A) P(A)$$

$$P(B|A) = \frac{P(A|B) P(B)}{P(A)}$$

Example



- **Given:**

$$P(\text{Cavity}) = 0.1$$

$$P(\text{Toothache}) = 0.05$$

$$P(\text{Cavity} | \text{Toothache}) = 0.8$$

- **Using Bayes' rule:**


$$P(\text{Toothache} | \text{Cavity}) = (0.8 \times 0.05) / 0.1$$
$$= 0.4$$

	Toothache	¬Toothache
Cavity	0.04	0.06
¬Cavity	0.01	0.89

The Monty Hall Problem



Suppose you're on a game show, and you're given the choice of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what's behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then says to you, "Do you want to pick door No. 2?" Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?



source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monty_Hall_problem

Solution



$$P(C2|O3) = P(O3|C2)P(C2)/P(O3) = 1 * 1/3 / 1/2 = 2/3$$

$$P(C1|O3) = P(O3|C1)P(C1)/P(O3) = 1/2 * 1/3 / 1/2 = 1/3$$

Car location:	Host opens:	Total probability:	Stay:	Switch:
Door 1	Door 2	1/6	Car	Goat
Door 1	Door 3	1/6	Car	Goat
Door 2	Door 3	1/3	Goat	Car
Door 3	Door 2	1/3	Goat	Car

Solution



$$P(C2|O3) = P(O3|C2)P(C2)/P(O3) = 1 * 1/3 / 1/2 = 2/3$$

$$P(O3) = P(O3|C1)P(C1) + P(O3|C2)P(C2) + P(O3|C3)P(C3) = 1/2 * 1/3 + 1 * 1/3 + 0 * 1/3 = 1/2$$

Probabilities in the wumpus world



1,4	2,4	3,4	4,4
1,3	2,3	3,3	4,3
1,2 B OK	2,2	3,2	4,2
1,1 OK	2,1 B OK	3,1	4,1

There is no safe choice at this point!
But are there squares that are less likely to contain a pit?

Probabilities in the wumpus world



1,4	2,4	3,4	4,4
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There is no safe choice at this point!
But are there squares that are less likely to contain a pit?

1,3	2,3	3,3	4,3
1,2 OK	2,2	3,2	4,2
1,1 OK	2,1 OK	3,1	4,1

Generalization of Bayes' rule



$$P(A \wedge B \wedge C) = P(A \wedge B|C) P(C) = P(A|B,C) P(B|C) P(C)$$

$$P(A \wedge B \wedge C) = P(A \wedge B|C) P(C) = P(B|A,C) P(A|C) P(C)$$

$$P(B|A,C) = \frac{P(A|B,C) P(B|C)}{P(A|C)}$$

It's all in the joint but...



- The naïve representation runs into problems.
- Example:
 - Patients in a hospital are described by attributes such as:
 - Background: age, gender, history of diseases, ...
 - Symptoms: fever, blood pressure, headache, ...
 - Diseases: pneumonia, heart attack, ...
 - A probability distribution needs to assign a number to each combination of values of these attributes
 - Size of table is exponential in number of attributes

Bayesian networks



- Provide an efficient representation that relies on independence relations between variables.

Naïve Bayesian



- In many cases, effects of a cause are conditionally independent from each other.
- Simplify the rule in a naïve Bayes model

$$P(Cause, Effect_1, \dots, Effect_n) = P(Cause) \prod_i P(Effect_i | Cause)$$