Course Introduction

"For me, great algorithms are the poetry of computation. Just like verse, they can be terse, allusive, dense, and even mysterious. But once unlocked, they cast a brilliant new light on some aspect of computing." - Francis Sullivan
Course Objectives

Algorithms:
- Design - strategies for algorithmic problem solving
  - advanced data structures and their use in algorithms
- Reasoning about algorithm correctness
- Analysis of time and space complexity
- Implementation - create an implementation that respects the runtime analysis

Algorithmic Approaches / Classes:
- Greedy
- Divide and Conquer
- Dynamic programming

Problem Classes:
- P: Polynomial, NP: Non deterministic Polynomial

Parallel Algorithms:
- Dynamic Multi-threading
Grading

Programming Assignments  20%
Written Assignments       20%
Quizzes                   10%
Exams                     50%

See   CS320 web site, let's go there now
Implementation

Programs will be written in Python:

- Powerful **data structures**
  - tuples, dictionaries, (array)lists
- Simple, easy to learn syntax
- Highly readable, compact code
- Supports object oriented and functional programming
- An extensive standard library
- Strong support for integration with other languages (**C**, **C++**, **Java**) and libraries (**numpy**, **Jupyter**, **CUDA**)

We assume you are familiar with Python (CS220)!
Python vs. e.g. Java

What makes Python different from Java?

- Java is statically typed, i.e. variables are bound to types at compile time. This avoids run time errors, but makes java programs more rigid.

- Python is dynamically typed, i.e. a variable takes on some type at run time, and its type can change. A variable can be of one type somewhere in the code and of another type somewhere else

  ```python
  # line is a String here
  line = line.strip().split(" ")
  # line is an (Array)List of Strings here
  ```

- This makes python programs more flexible, but can cause strange run time errors, e.g. when a caller expects a return value but the called function does not return one.
Does anyone else use Python?

One of the three “official languages” in Google. (Guido van Rossum, creator of Python, was a Googler (and also a researcher at the Mathematical Center in Amsterdam)

Peter Norvig, Director of Research at Google:

"Python has been an important part of Google since the beginning, and remains so as the system grows and evolved. Today dozens of Google engineers use Python, and we're looking for more people with skills in this language"

Yahoo groups, Yahoo maps -- 100% python
Our approach to problem solving

- Formulate it with precision (usually using mathematical concepts, such as sets, relations, and graphs)
- Design an algorithm and its main data structures
- Prove its correctness
- Analyze its complexity (time, space)
  - Improve the initial algorithm (in terms of complexity), preserving correctness
- Implement it, preserving the complexity
Our first problem: matching

Two parties e.g., companies and applicants

- Each applicant has a preference list of companies
- Each company has a preference list of applicants
- A possible scenario:
  - cA offers job to aA
  - aA accepts, but now gets offer from cX
  - aA likes cX more, retracts offer from cA
  - now cA offers job to aB, who retracts his acceptance of an offer from cB
- We would like a systematic method for assigning applicants to companies—stable matching
- A system like this is in use for matching residents with hospitals
Stable Matching

**Goal.** Given a set of preferences among companies and applicants, design a stable matching process.

**Unstable pair:** student $x$ and company $y$ are an unstable pair (not in the current matching) if:
- $x$ prefers $y$ to its assigned company and
- $y$ prefers $x$ to one of its admitted students.

**Stable assignment.** Assignment without unstable pairs.
- Natural and desirable condition.
Is some control possible?

Given the preference lists of applicants $A$ and companies $C$, can we assign $A$s to $C$s such that for each $C$

for each $A$ not scheduled to work for $C$
   either $C$ prefers all its students to $A$
   or $A$ prefers current company to $C$

If this holds, then what?
Stable state

Given the preference lists of applicants A and companies C, can we assign As to Cs such that for each C:

for each A not scheduled to work for C
  C prefers all its students to A
or A prefers current company to C

If this holds, there is no unstable pair, and therefore individual self interest will prevent changes in student / company matches:

Stable state
Simplifying the problem

Matching students/companies problem a bit messy:

- Company may look for multiple applicants, students looking for a single internship

- Maybe there are more jobs than applicants, or fewer jobs than applicants

- Maybe some applicants/jobs are equally liked by companies/applicants (partial orders)

Formulate a "bare-bones" version of the problem
Stable Matching Problem

**Perfect matching:** Each man matched with exactly one woman, and each woman matched with exactly one man.

**Stability:** no incentive for some pair to undermine the assignment.

- A pair \((m,w)\) NOT IN THE CURRENT MATCHING is an *instability* if man \(m\) and woman \(w\) prefer each other to current partners in the matching.
- Both \(m\) and \(w\) can improve their situation

**Stable matching:** perfect matching with no unstable pairs. **Stable matching problem:** Given the preference lists of \(n\) men and \(n\) women, find a stable matching if one exists.
The Stable Matching Problem

Problem: Given $n$ men and $n$ women where

- Each man lists women in **total order** of preference
- Each woman lists men in **total order** of preference

- What is a total order? Do you know an example?

Do you know a counter example?

find a stable matching of all men and women
Men: $M=\{m_1,\ldots,m_n\}$  Women: $W=\{w_1,\ldots,w_n\}$

The Cartesian Product $M \times W$ is the set of all possible ordered pairs.

A matching $S$ is a set of pairs (subset of $M \times W$) such that each $m$ and $w$ occurs in at most one pair.

A perfect matching $S$ is a set of pairs (subset of $M \times W$) such that each individual occurs in exactly one pair.

How many perfect matchings are there?
Instability

Given a perfect match, eg

\[ S = \{ (m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2) \} \]

But \( m_1 \) prefers \( w_2 \) and \( w_2 \) prefers \( m_1 \)

\((m_1, w_2)\) is an instability for \( S \)

(notice that \((m_1, w_2)\) is not in \( S \))

\( S \) is a **stable matching** if:

- \( S \) is perfect
- and there is no instability w.r.t. \( S \)
Example 1

$m_1$: $w_1$, $w_2$  $m_2$: $w_1$, $w_2$

$w_1$: $m_1$, $m_2$  $w_2$: $m_1$, $m_2$

What are the perfect matchings?
Example 1

\[ m_1: w_1, w_2 \quad m_2: w_1, w_2 \]
\[ w_1: m_1, m_2 \quad w_2: m_1, m_2 \]

1. \{ (m_1,w_1), (m_2,w_2) \}
2. \{ (m_1,w_2), (m_2,w_1) \}

which is stable/instable?
Example 1

\[ m_1: \ w_1, \ w_2 \quad m_2: \ w_1, \ w_2 \]
\[ w_1: \ m_1, \ m_2 \quad w_2: \ m_1, \ m_2 \]

1. \( \{ (m_1,w_1), (m_2,w_2) \} \) stable, WHY?
2. \( \{ (m_1,w_2), (m_2,w_1) \} \) unstable, WHY?
Example 2

\[ m_1: w_1, w_2 \quad \quad m_2: w_2, w_1 \]
\[ w_1: m_2, m_1 \quad \quad w_2: m_1, m_2 \]

1. \{ (m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2) \}
2. \{ (m_1, w_2), (m_2, w_1) \}

which is / are instable/stable?

Conclusion?
Example 3

\[ m_1: w_1, w_2, w_3 \quad m_2: w_2, w_3, w_1 \quad m_3: w_3, w_1, w_2 \]
\[ w_1: m_2, m_1, m_3 \quad w_2: m_1, m_2, m_3 \quad w_3: m_1, m_2, m_3 \]

Is \{ (m_1,w_1), (m_2,w_2), (m_3,w_3) \} stable?

Is \{ (m_1,w_2), (m_2,w_1), (m_3,w_3) \} stable?
Questions…

- Given a preference list, does a stable matching exist?
- Can we efficiently construct a stable matching if there is one?
- A naive algorithm:

  ```python
  for S in the set of all perfect matchings :
    if S is stable : return S
  return None
  ```

  Is this algorithm correct?
  What is its running time?
Towards an algorithm

initially: no match

An unmatched man \( m \) proposes to the woman \( w \) highest on his list. 
Will this be part of a stable matching?
Towards an algorithm

initially: no match

An unmatched man $m$ proposes to the woman $w$ highest on his list.
Will this be part of a stable matching?
  Not necessarily: $w$ may like some $m'$ better, AND?

So $w$ and $m$ will be in a temporary state of engagement.

$w$ is prepared to change her mind when a man higher on her list proposes.
While not everyone is matched...

An unmatched man $m$ proposes to the woman $w$ highest on his list that he hasn't proposed to yet.

If $w$ is free, they become engaged

If $w$ is engaged to $m'$:
  If $w$ prefers $m'$ over $m$, $m$ stays free
  If $w$ prefers $m$ over $m'$, $(m,w)$ become engaged
The Gayle-Shapley algorithm\textsuperscript{1}

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman)

    Choose such a man $m$

    $w =$ highest-ranked woman on $m$'s list to whom $m$ has not yet proposed

    if (w is free)
        $(m,w)$ become engaged
    else if (w prefers $m$ to her fiancé $m'$)
        $(m,w)$ become engaged, $m'$ becomes free
    else
        $m$ remains free

A few non-obvious questions:

How long does it take?

Does the algorithm return a stable matching?

Does it even return a perfect matching?

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman)
    Choose such a man m
    w = highest-ranked woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
    if (w is free)
       (m,w) become engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
       (m,w) become engaged, m' becomes free
    else
       m remains free

Each woman w remains engaged from the first proposal
and the sequence of w-s partners gets better
Each man proposes to less and less preferred women and will not propose to the same woman twice
Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman)

    Choose such a man $m$

    $w =$ highest-ranked woman on $m$'s list to whom $m$ has not yet proposed

    if ($w$ is free)
        $(m,w)$ become engaged
    else if ($w$ prefers $m$ to her fiancé $m'$)
        $(m,w)$ become engaged, $m'$ becomes free
    else
        $m$ remains free

Claim. The algorithm terminates after at most $n^2$ iterations of the while loop.
Observations

Claim. The algorithm terminates after at most $n^2$ iterations of the while loop.

At each iteration a man proposes (only once) to a woman he has never proposed to, and there are only $n^2$ possible pairs $(m,w)$

**WHY ONLY $n^2$?**

only $n$ choices for each of the $n$ men
When the loop terminates, the matching is **perfect**

**Proof: By contradiction.** Assume there is a free man, m.

Because the loop terminates, m proposed to all women

But then all women are engaged, hence there is no free man

→ **Contradiction**
Proof of Correctness: Stability

Claim. No instable pairs. Proof. (by contradiction)

- Suppose \((m, w)\) is an instable pair: each prefers each other to partner in Gale-Shapley matching \(S^*\).
  - Case 1: \(m\) never proposed to \(w\).
    \(\Rightarrow\) \(m\) prefers his GS partner \(w'\) to \(w\)
    \(\Rightarrow\) \((m, w)\) is not instable.

  - Case 2: \(m\) proposed to \(w\).
    \(\Rightarrow\) \(w\) rejected \(m\) (right away or later)
    \(\Rightarrow\) \(w\) prefers her GS partner \(m'\) to \(m\).
    \(\Rightarrow\) \((m, w)\) is not instable.

- In either case \((m, w)\) is not instable, a contradiction.
Summary

**Stable matching problem.** Given $n$ men and $n$ women and their preferences, find a stable matching if one exists.

**Gale-Shapley algorithm.** Guaranteed to find a stable matching for any problem instance.

**Q.** If there are multiple stable matchings, which one does GS find?
Which solution?

\[ m_1: \ w_1, \ w_2 \quad m_2: \ w_2, \ w_1 \]
\[ w_1: \ m_2, \ m_1 \quad w_2: \ m_1, \ m_2 \]

Two stable solutions

1: \( \{ (m_1,w_1), (m_2,w_2) \} \)
2: \( \{ (m_1,w_2), (m_2,w_1) \} \)

GS will always find one of them (which?)

When will the other be found?
The stable matching problem is symmetric w.r.t. to men and women, but the GS algorithm is asymmetric.

There is a certain unfairness in the algorithm: If all men list different women as their first choice, they will end up with their first choice, regardless of the women's preferences (see example 3).
Non-determinism

Notice the following line in the GS algorithm:

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman)

Choose such a man m

The algorithm does not specify WHICH

Still, it can be shown that all executions of the algorithm find the same stable matching.

This ends our discussion of stable matching.
Representative Problems
Remember the problem solving paradigm

1. Formulate it with precision (usually using mathematical concepts, such as sets, relations, and graphs, costs, benefits, optimization criteria)

2. Design an algorithm

3. Prove its correctness, e.g. in terms of \textit{pre} and \textit{post} conditions

4. Analyze its complexity

5. Implement respecting the derived complexity

Often, steps 2-5 are repeated, to improve efficiency
Interval Scheduling

You have a resource (hotel room, printer, lecture room, telescope, manufacturing facility, professor...)

There are requests to use the resource in the form of start time $s_i$ and finish time $f_i$, such that $s_i < f_i$

Objective: grant as many requests as possible.

Two requests $i$ and $j$ are compatible if they don't overlap, i.e.

\[ f_i \leq s_j \text{ or } f_j \leq s_i \]
Interval Scheduling

**Input.** Set of jobs with start times and finish times.

**Goal.** Find **maximum cardinality** subset of compatible jobs.

What happens if you pick the first starting (a)?, the smallest (c)? What is the optimum?
Algorithmic Approach

The interval scheduling problem is amenable to a very simple solution.

Now that you know this, can you think of it?

Hint: Think how to pick a first interval while preserving the longest possible free time...
Weighted Interval Scheduling

**Input.** Set of jobs with start times, finish times, and profits.

**Goal.** Find maximum profit subset of compatible jobs.
Bipartite Matching

Stable matching was defined as matching elements of two disjoint sets.

We can express this in terms of graphs.

A graph is **bipartite** if its nodes can be partitioned in two sets $X$ and $Y$, such that the edges go from an $x$ in $X$ to a $y$ in $Y$. 
Bipartite Matching

Input. Bipartite graph.
Goal. Find maximum cardinality matching.

Matching in bipartite graphs can model assignment problems, e.g., assigning jobs to machines, where an edge between a job j and a machine m indicates that m can do job j, or professors and courses.

How is this different from the stable matching problem?
Independent Set

**Input.** Graph.

**Goal.** Find maximum cardinality independent set: subset of nodes such that no two are joined by an edge.

Can you formulate interval scheduling as an independent set problem? If so, how could you solve the interval scheduling problem?
Independent set problem

- There is no known efficient way to solve the independent set problem.

- But we just said: we can formulate interval scheduling as independent set problem..... ???

- What does "no efficient way" mean?

- The only solution we have so far is trying all sub sets and finding the largest independent one.

- How many sub sets of a set of n nodes are there?
Looking ahead...

- **Interval scheduling:** $n \log(n)$ greedy algorithm.

- **Weighted interval scheduling:** $n \log(n)$ dynamic programming algorithm.

- **Independent set:** NP (no known polynomial algorithm exists).
Algorithm

Algorithm: effective procedure

- mapping input to output

effective: unambiguous, executable

- Turing defined it as: "like a Turing machine"

- program = effective procedure

Is there an algorithm for every possible problem?
Algorithm

Algorithm: effective procedure

- mapping input to output

**effective:** unambiguous, executable

- Turing defined it as: "like a Turing machine"
- program = effective procedure

Is there an algorithm for every possible problem?

No, the problem must be effectively specified: "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" not effective. **Even if** it is effectively specified, there is not always an algorithm to provide an answer. This occurs often for programs analyzing programs (examples?)
def f(n):
    if (n==1) return 1
    elif (odd(n)) return f(3*n+1)
    else return f(n/2)
Ulam's problem

```python
def f(n):
    if (n==1) return 1
    elif (odd(n)) return f(3*n+1)
    else return f(n/2)
```

Steps in running f(n) for a few values of n:
1
2, 1
3, 10, 5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
4, 2, 1
5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
6, 3, 10, 5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
7, 22, 11, 34, 17, 52, 26, 13, 40, 20, 10, 5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
8, 4, 2, 1
9, 28, 14, 7, 22, 11, 34, 17, 52, 26, 13, 40, 20, 10, 5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1
10, 5, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1

Does f(n) always stop?
Ulam's problem

def f(n):
    if (n==1) return 1
    elif (odd(n)) return f(3*n+1)
    else return f(n/2)

Nobody has found an n for which f does not stop
Nobody has found a proof (so there can be no algorithm deciding this) that f stops for all n
A generalization of this problem has been proven to be undecidable. It is called the Halting Problem.
A problem P is undecidable, if there is no algorithm that produces P(x) for every possible input x
The Halting Problem is undecidable

Given a program $P$ and input $x$ will $P$ stop on $x$?

We can prove (cs420):

the halting problem is undecidable

i.e. there is no algorithm $\text{Halt}(P, x)$ that for any program $P$ and input $x$ decides whether $P$ stops on $x$.

But for some “nice” programs, we can prove they halt.
Verification/equivalence undecidable

Given any specification $S$ and any program $P$ there is no algorithm that decides whether $P$ executes according to $S$

Given any two programs $P_1$ and $P_2$, there is no algorithm that decides $\forall x: P_1(x) = P_2(x)$

Does this mean we should not build program verifiers?
Intractability

Suppose we have a program,

- does it execute a in a reasonable time?
- E.g., towers of Hanoi (cs200).

Three pegs, one with \( n \) smaller and smaller disks, move (1 disk at the time) to another peg without ever placing a larger disk on a smaller disk.

\[ f(n) = \# \text{ moves for tower of size } n \]

Monk: before a tower of Hanoi of size 100 is moved, the world will have vanished
def hanoi(n, from, to):
    if (n>0):
        via = 6 - from - to
        hanoi(n-1,from,via)
        print "move disk", n, " from", from, " to ", to
        hanoi(n-1,via,to);
f(n): #moves in hanoi

\[ f(n) = 2f(n-1) + 1, \quad f(1)=1 \]
\[ f(1) = 1, \quad f(2) = 3, \quad f(3) = 7, \quad f(4) = 15 \]

\[ f(n) = 2^{n-1} \]

How can you show that?

Can you write an iterative Hanoi algorithm?

Was the monk right?
\[ 2^{100} \text{ moves, say 1 per second} \ldots \]
How many years?
Is there a better algorithm?

THE ONE MILLION DOLLAR QUESTION IN THIS CLASS
Is there a better algorithm?

Pile(n-1) must be off peg1 and completely on one other peg before disk n can be moved to its destination

so (inductively) all moves are necessary
Algorithm complexity

Measures in units of **time** and **space**

Linear Search $X$ in dictionary $D$

\[
i = 1 \\
\text{while not at end and } X \neq D[i]: \\
i = i + 1
\]

We don't know if $X$ is in $D$, and we don't know where it is, so we can only give **worst** or **average** time bounds

We don't know the time for atomic actions, so we only determine **Orders of Magnitude**
Linear Search: time and space complexity

Space: $n$ locations in $D$ plus some local variables

Time:
In the worst case we search all of $D$, so the loop body is executed $n$ times

In average case analysis we compute the expected number of steps: i.e., we sum the products of the probability of each option and the time cost of that option. In the average case the loop body is executed about $n/2$ times

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{n} \cdot i = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} i = \frac{n(n+1)/2}{n} \approx n/2$$